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THE ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE 
STANDARD IN REDISTRICTING: THE 
USES AND ABUSES OF POPULATION 
DEVIATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE 
REDISTRICTING  
Thomas L. Brunell† 
ABSTRACT 
Since the Redistricting Revolution of the 1960s, which began with 
a series of Supreme Court decisions that forced states to draw equally 
populated districts for the United States House and state legislative 
chambers, the standards for congressional and legislative districts 
have evolved differently over time. Today’s standards call for 
virtually no population deviations for congressional districts, though 
legislative districts can typically deviate up to 10 percent. In practice 
this means that districts can vary by as much as 5 percent above and 
below the ideal population within a state. Based on a review of data 
from forty-seven states after the 2000 redistricting cycle, this Article 
demonstrates that these population deviations are a simple tool for 
those that redraw electoral boundaries to create a partisan 
gerrymander. If one party controls the redistricting process, districts 
from the opposite party are typically overpopulated and districts 
favoring the party in control are usually underpopulated. Based on 
this phenomenon, this Article argues that courts ought to abolish the 
“10 percent” rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the 2010 Census, each state used data from the results 
of the decennial headcount to redraw state legislative and, in those 
states with more than one district, congressional electoral boundaries. 
This process is time consuming, expensive, susceptible to litigation, 
and vitally important for many politicians. Most voters are unaware 
that redistricting is taking place and they are even less likely to know 
if and how it affected the voting districts where they reside. 
Remapping electoral boundaries provides politicians an opportunity 
to affect the distribution of seats within their own state and to 
improve individual members’ chances of being reelected. This 
Article’s focus is one important aspect of redistricting: the extent to 
which those in charge of redistricting use population deviations across 
districts in state legislative redistricting. 
Modern redistricting revolves around a handful of accepted criteria 
or principles, most of which are not consistently enforced. 
Compactness, or the shape of districts, is one principle that is not 
heavily enforced.1 Protecting communities of interest is a rather 
amorphous criterion that can mean virtually anything when it comes 
time to litigate a map, but at its most basic level, it means preserving 
other political boundaries, such as county and municipal lines.2 
Contiguity, which requires that all parts of a district be connected, 
however, is strictly required and enforced.3 Another criterion that 
courts routinely enforce is that of one person, one vote (“OPOV”), 
which mandates that districts within a state be nearly equal in 
population.4  
In this Article, I review the relevant case law pertaining to the 
OPOV standards and explain the differences between congressional 
and state legislative standards for OPOV. Then, I examine how the 
more relaxed approach to state legislative districts is used primarily 
for political purposes. And, lastly, I argue that courts ought to require 
                                                                                                                 
1
 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
483, 531 (1993) (claiming that “redistricting bodies do not take compactness into account any 
more when it is legally required, and that courts have not been willing to enforce such 
requirements in ways that affect outcomes”). 
2
 See, e.g., Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (D.S.D. 2005) (noting 
that South Dakota’s redistricting communities of interest are protected through “compact and 
contiguous districts, respect for geographical and political boundaries, and protection of 
minority voting rights consistent with the United States Constitution”). 
3
 See Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Parisian 
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 580–81 (2011) (noting that contiguity is required but 
can also be easily satisfied). 
4
 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–31 (1983). 
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all representative districts to abide by the very strictest of standards: 
equal population.5  
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY AND LANDSCAPE6 
In Baker v. Carr,7 the Supreme Court finally stepped into the 
“political thicket” of redistricting and addressed legislative 
malapportionment, or the creation of districts with dramatic 
population variances within the same state. In a series of famous 
cases in the 1960s, the Court decided that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution served as grounds to strike down legislative 
redistricting maps that had egregious population deviations with a 
single state.8 In the early 1960s, for example, the average state Senate 
district in California was comprised of just under 400,000 people.9 
The standard deviation for state Senate districts at the same time was 
over 900,000 people, indicating a large variance in the population of 
these electoral districts.10 The variance stemmed, in large part, 
because Los Angeles County, the most heavily populated county in 
the state, had just one seat prior to the Supreme Court’s insistence on 
population equality.11 After the OPOV decisions, however, Los 
Angeles County was represented by 14.5 people in the state Senate.12  
The idea behind the Baker v. Carr and related decisions is 
straightforward: If one voter lives in a district with 50,000 people and 
another voter in the same state lives in a district that only had 5,000 
people, then the voters in the second district cast a far more powerful 
and important vote than their fellow citizens in the first district. 
                                                                                                                 
5
 This is a similar proposal to outcome-based regulation. See generally Michael P. 
McDonald, Regulating Redistricting, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 675, 677 (2007) (reviewing 
outcome-based regulations); Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 755 (2004) (advocating for temporal limitations to the redistricting 
process).   
6
 For an in-depth look at the court cases including some hints about what the Justices 
were faced with at the time and a history of congressional and state legislative reactions, see 
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, 
ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 160–82 (2008).  
7
 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
8
 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause required state legislative districts to be apportioned on a population basis); cf. 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Article I, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution required congressional districts to abide by the OPOV rule). 
9
 Glendon Schubert, To the Editor, Malapportionment Remeasured, 58 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 966, 967 tbl.II (1964).  
10
 Id.  
11
 Bruce W. Robeck, Legislative Partisanship, Constituency and Malapportionment: The 
Case of California, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1246, 1248 (1972). 
12
 Id.  
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Legislatures represent people, the Court recognized, not land, trees, or 
square mileage.13  
Baker concerned the redistricting process in Tennessee. In the 
1960s, the Tennessee constitution required the state legislature to 
redraw legislative districts after each decennial census.14 Despite this 
requirement, the state’s legislative district lines remained static 
between 1901 and 1960.15 Because the population growth during this 
time was, by and large, in the state’s urban areas, these stagnant 
district lines led to vastly underrepresented urban areas.16 The 
plaintiffs for the case included citizens from Memphis, Knoxville, and 
Nashville—the major urban areas of the state. In a lengthy opinion, 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, carefully considered 
justiciability, jurisdiction, and standing.17 In the process of finding no 
bar to the plaintiff’s claim, he disposed of Colegrove v. Green,18 a 
case in which the court refused to intercede in redistricting related 
matters.19  
Other related and equally important redistricting decisions 
followed shortly after Baker. In 1963, the Court heard Gray v. 
Sanders,20 which involved a Georgia law that required votes in 
primary elections for statewide offices to be tallied using a county-
unit system.21 The Supreme Court ruled that this system violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because the weight of a vote was not equal, 
but rather depended on the size of the county in which a voter 
resided.22   
                                                                                                                 
13
 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Legislators represent people, not 
trees or acres.”). 
14
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188–90 (1962) (noting the requirements of the Tennessee 
Constitution). 
15
 Id. at 191 (“In the more than 60 years since that [1901] action, all proposals in both 
Houses of the General Assembly for reapportionment have failed to pass.”). 
16
 See id. at 255–58 (Clark, J., concurring) (illustrating disparities). 
17
 See id. at 204–237 (explaining the rationales behind the Court’s disposal of those 
issues). 
18
 328 U.S. 549 (1946).  
19
 Baker, 369 U.S. at 203, 206, 209, 249–50. 
20
 372 U.S. 368 (1963).  
21 Here is a description of the system in place from the syllabus:  
Counties with populations not exceeding 15,000, two units; an additional unit for the next 
5,000 persons; an additional unit for the next 10,000; an additional unit for each of the next two 
brackets of 15,000; and, thereafter, two more units for each increase of 30,000. All candidates 
for statewide office were required to receive a majority of the county-unit votes to be entitled to 
nomination in the first primary. The practical effect of this system is that the vote of each citizen 
counts for less and less as the population of his county increases, and a combination of the units 
from the counties having the smallest population gives counties having one-third of the total 
population of the State a clear majority of county votes.  
Id. at 368. 
22
 Id. at 379. 
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At this time, many states mimicked the federal legislature by 
apportioning the two state legislative chambers on different basis. For 
instance, in 1962 the Alabama legislature proposed an amendment to 
the state constitution which would have apportioned the state senate 
by county—each of the sixty-seven counties would get one senator.23 
Though this is analogous to the United States Senate, the Court held 
that “State[s] [must] make an honest and good faith effort to construct 
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.”24 Thus, the court killed the “federal 
analogy” for having even one chamber of the state legislature being 
apportioned according to something other than equal population.  
While a majority of the Justices clearly saw a need to equalize the 
population across districts within a state, they were also clear that 
they did not think that perfect population equality was required: 
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard 
are based on legitimate considerations incident to the 
effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from 
the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible 
with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of 
the two houses of a bicameral state legislature.25  
This is the language that led us down the road of permissible 
deviations from strict population equality for state legislative districts. 
A year later, in Wesberry v. Sanders,26 the Court ruled that states 
must draw districts for the U.S. House of Representatives so that the 
population in each district is nearly as equal as possible because each 
person’s vote in a state ought to be weighted equally.27 Unlike those 
cases involving state apportionment procedures, the Court based 
congressional OPOV standards on Article I, section 2 of the 
Constitution, which requires that states receive seats in the House 
“according to their respective Numbers.”28 Over time, the federal 
judiciary has interpreted this as requiring nearly absolute equality.29 
But since the justification for legislative district equality comes from 
the Equal Protection Clause, “judicial deference to state interests and 
                                                                                                                 
23
 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 543–44 (1964).  
24
 Id. at 577. 
25
 Id. at 579. 
26
 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
27
 See id. at 7–8 (“We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, 
§ 2, that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as 
is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”). 
28
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
29
 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8. 
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practical necessity” is required.30 Thus, there is a distinction between 
the level of equality required based on the office for which the state 
legislature is drawing the lines.   
Later, the Court in Karcher v. Daggett31 established a two-step test 
with respect to population equality for congressional districts. Under 
the Karcher test, a court must first assess whether the state could have 
reduced or eliminated the population differences with a good faith 
effort.32 Then, if the challengers “can establish that the population 
differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve 
equality, the State . . . bear[s] the burden of proving that each 
significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some 
legitimate goal.”33  
Courts have found that small population deviations across 
congressional districts pass muster when the state demonstrates a 
compelling governmental interest to justify these deviations from 
OPOV.34 Courts sometimes, however, find that very small deviations 
are sufficient to force a change in the map. For instance, the 2000 
congressional redistricting plan in Pennsylvania had a deviation of 
just nineteen people, but the people that drew the plan had no 
compelling explanation for why these deviations existed.35 They 
simply decided that the nineteen-person deviation was close enough, 
and the district court found that this explanation failed to meet the 
second part of the Karcher test.36  
The court’s decision, at first blush, seems ridiculous. After all, 
census data are not perfect.37 And, even with perfect data, when this 
litigation reached federal court over a year after the 2000 Census’s 
completion, the demography of Pennsylvania had surely changed 
enough to make the court’s decision to throw out the map because of 
a nineteen-person deviation absurd. Despite these flaws, the equal 
population standard is still the correct approach as it is the only 
deviation that is not arbitrary, and it precludes mapmakers from 
playing fast and loose with deviations across districts to extract more 
seats for one party.  
                                                                                                                 
30
 Stephanie Cirkovich, Note, Abandoning the Ten Percent Rule and Reclaiming One 
Person, One Vote, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1823, 1832 (2010). 
31
 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
32
 Id. at 730. 
33
 Id. at 731. 
34
 See J. GERALD HERBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING 
THE LEGAL PITFALLS 10–11 (2000) (giving some examples). 
35
 Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675, 678 (2002).  
36
 Id. at 676, 678. 
37
 See Benjamin J. Razi, Comment, Census Politics Revisited: What to Do When the 
Government Can’t Count?, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1101, 1105–1111 (1999) (describing various 
flaws with census methodology and its negative effect on the accuracy of census data).  
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Since state legislative districts are not held to absolute equality, the 
standards across time and across courts have been much more flexible 
than OPOV standards for congressional districts. Until recently, it 
was commonly believed that deviations for legislative districts of up 
to 10 percent were acceptable without any justification whatsoever. In 
effect, there existed a “safe harbor.”38 Courts even permitted 
deviations above ten percent if the state could show a legitimate, 
longstanding, and consistently applied policy. There are numerous 
examples where deviations upwards of 20 percent were acceptable.39 
In Cox v. Larios,40 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three 
judge panel’s decision holding Georgia’s 2001 redistricting plan 
unconstitutional based on OPOV.41 The Georgia Democrats attempted 
to push the “10 percent rule” to the extreme: the plan underpopulated 
nearly all of the heavily Democratic inner-city districts by 5 percent 
and overpopulated all predominantly Republican rural and suburban 
districts by 5 percent.42 Cox upset the commonly assumed notion that 
10 percent deviations fall within an effective constitutional safe 
harbor. The decision also created uncertainty about what level of 
population deviation is allowed.  
With all the talk about “one person, one vote” in redistricting one 
might mistakenly believe that districts are in fact equal. But this is 
definitely not the case. The deviations are obviously dramatically 
smaller than they were before Baker v. Carr and its progeny, but 
many states still do not adhere to the OPOV principle and the legal 
landscape remains murky. One commentator summed it up nicely:  
While on its face this [drawing equipopulous districts] is a 
straightforward and easily administrable endeavor, the 
Supreme Court has saddled the one person, one vote doctrine 
with several vulnerabilities, including loose, uneven 
standards that apply to different types of apportionment cases, 
insurmountable burdens of proof, and equivocation about the 
Court’s own ability to adjudicate redistricting claims because 
of the partisanship that permeates the redistricting process.43 
                                                                                                                 
38
 For instance, reviewing a case from New Jersey, Sam Hirsch noted that “[t]he total 
population deviation was less than 7.9%—well within the 10% limit tolerated by the Federal 
Constitution’s ‘one person, one vote’ doctrine.” Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A 
Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7, 11 (2002).  
39
 See HERBERT ET AL., supra note 34, at 10–11 (giving some examples). 
40
 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
41
 Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).   
42
 Id. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
43
 Cirkovich, supra note 30, at 1825. 
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II. ARBITRARINESS 
In thinking about crafting standards for allowable population 
deviations across representative districts the typical reaction is usually 
something along the lines of “equal population is silly, so let’s allow 
for some amount of deviations across districts.” While there is a 
certain amount of commonsense logic behind this line of reasoning,44 
after all the data from the census is not correct to begin with and they 
become less correct with each passing day, but the problem is in 
deciding what standard to use for the amount of allowable deviation. 
Should it be 1 percent? 10 percent? No more than 1,000 people? If we 
choose one of these benchmarks, say 10 percent, then what happens 
when the plan is nineteen people over the 10 percent limit? We are 
right back where we started—striking down a plan for a deviation that 
is statistically equivalent to zero.  
A zero population deviation standard, even though it strikes most 
people as facially ridiculous, has the appealing property of being the 
only standard that is not arbitrary. All districts across the state have 
the same number of people in them. The standard is easy to 
understand, and implementing it is not overly burdensome on the 
people redrawing the lines. There should be no exceptions to this rule, 
because if the door is left open, then map drawers will constantly 
seek, and judges will invariably grant, variances from the rule.  
III. PARTISANSHIP 
Another major problem with setting a standard for allowable 
deviations is that, whatever the level, the mapmakers are likely going 
to utilize the variance for partisan purposes. This is one of the easiest 
tools to use in the gerrymandering toolkit. If the Democrats are in 
control, then Democratic-leaning districts will be underpopulated (5 
percent below the ideal population of a district) and Republican 
districts will tend to be overpopulated (5 percent above the ideal 
population). This allows the Democrats to squeeze extra seats out of 
the map for their side. Suffice it to say, when the Republicans are in 
control one can fully expect the opposite scenario to take place. 
Stephanie Cirkovich makes a similar argument—“The Court has 
allowed states to deviate from this good faith attempt by 10 percent, 
and its willingness to tolerate partisanship in the objective one person, 
one vote arena has muddied . . . the line between legislative and 
judicial functions.”45 She concludes with a recommendation that the 
                                                                                                                 
44
 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
45
 Cirkovich, supra note 30, at 1857–58. 
2012] THE ONE PERSON ONE VOTE STANDARD 1065 
Court revisit these standards, and abolish the 10 percent rule 
altogether.46  
Georgia legislative redistricting from the 2000 round serves as an 
excellent example for how partisans can exploit population deviations 
and how the judicial system can respond to this type of 
gerrymandering.47 The Democrats controlled the state government in 
2001,48 which means they were able to draw the lines for legislative 
and congressional districts without Republican input. At this time the 
Republicans were winning a majority of the votes in Georgia state 
legislative elections; however, they were not winning a majority of 
the seats.49 Using a variety of methods, including population 
deviations, the Democrats sought to solidify their control of state 
government. One method they used was to more efficiently spread 
Democratic loyalists across more districts. This meant taking districts 
with overwhelming majorities of African Americans and making 
them more “lean” by reducing the proportion of African Americans 
from over 60 percent to a proportion closer to 50 percent. This 
allowed the Democrats to use their votes more efficiently and 
increase the likelihood that they could win more seats in the elections 
that followed the remap.50 Crafty line drawing also allowed the 
Democrats to pit dozens of Republican members of the legislature in 
head to head contests, which resulted in a loss of eighteen Republican 
members of the state legislature.51 Finally, the Democrats fully 
exploited the 10 percent population deviation allowance by 
systematically underpopulating Democratic leaning districts and 
overpopulating Republican leaning districts.52 
                                                                                                                 
46
 See id. at 1826 (aruging that “courts should eliminate the ten percent rule altogether and 
require states to strive for minimal deviation from one person, one vote”). 
47
 See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) 
(holding unconstitutional Georgia’s redistricting plan that had a 9.98 percent population 
deviation). Throughout this Article, the term gerrymandering means when one party draws 
district lines in order to have the effect of introducing a bias in seats that favors their party, at 
the expense of the other party. While this particular set of facts has the Democrats 
gerrymandering the Republicans out of seats in Georgia, the Republicans are equally adept at 
creative redistricting for partisan purposes.  
48
 CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN 
AMERICA 157 (2010).  
49
 Id.  
50
 This also makes Democrats more vulnerable, however, as in any type of gerrymander. 
51
 BULLOCK, supra note 48, at 160. 
52
 See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) 
(holding unconstitutional Georgia’s redistricting plan that had a 9.98 percent population 
deviation).  
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IV. SHOULD “COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS” BE TAKEN INTO 
CONSIDERATION? 
Many states have drawn districts, even congressional districts, 
which exhibit less than perfectly equal population distributions. 
Sometimes courts frown upon this tactic, but other times courts have 
blessed these maps because there was a “compelling state interest” in 
drawing the district lines the way that they did.53 And often times, as 
David Butler and Bruce Cain note, the criteria used in districting are 
often times in tension with one another.54 If we insist on strict 
population equality, then preserving “communities of interest” 
becomes more difficult. One example is Iowa where the districts had 
a deviation of 134 people or 0.02 percent deviation from ideal 
population.55 Clearly the deviations are very small, but federal courts 
have forced states to redraw maps with smaller deviations 
(Pennsylvania example above).56 In Iowa, however, the mapmakers 
did not split any counties in the plan, so in this instance small 
deviations are offset by another competing criterion.57  
While the population deviations in Iowa were relatively small, it is 
not obvious that preserving county boundaries is a “democratic good” 
that ought to be weighed more heavily than equalizing the power of 
votes among individuals. Were the people of Iowa better represented 
because the counties were not split? Did any of these alleged gains 
make up for the fact that some voters cast ballots that counted for 
more than some of their fellow Iowans? Keeping all the counties 
whole, as they did in Iowa, seems a bit more like a neat parlor trick 
rather than a basis for districting that enhances representation. We 
should take OPOV seriously because it makes sense from both a legal 
and political perspective. 
The current allowable levels of population deviation limit state 
legislatures’ ability to keep communities of interest whole. The court 
may approve a 10 percent range of deviation, typically 5 percent over 
and 5 percent under the ideal population.58 Thus, if the ideal district 
contains 100,000 people, the deviation allows one to draw districts in 
                                                                                                                 
53
 See HERBERT ET AL., supra note 34, at 10–11 (giving some examples) 
54
 DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 65–90 (1992).  
55
 BULLOCK, supra note 48, at 40. 
56
 See text accompany notes 36–37 (discussing the 2000 Pennsylvania redistricting plan, 
which had a deviation of nineteen people and was held unconstitutional). 
57
 BULLOCK, supra note 48, at 40. 
58
 See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325–26 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 
(2004) (noting that “incumbents in all areas of the state sought to limit the expansion of their 
districts to what was considered legally necessary, i.e., a population deviation of ± 5%”).  
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the range of 95,000 people to 105,000 people. This does give some 
added flexibility in terms of being able to include whole cities or 
counties, but the flexibility is really quite small. If a plan drew all the 
districts at 100,000 people, then, theoretically, the only additional 
communities of interest that would be preserved under the 10 percent 
allowance are those that are larger than 100,000 people but smaller 
than 105,001 people.  
There exists no evidence, however, supporting the notion that a 
city or county is always better off when they are kept whole in a 
single district relative to being put into two or more districts. Having 
multiple representatives could prove valuable, though the trade-off is 
the pieces of the city or county may be but a small fraction of the total 
population of the districts. Often the slippery notion of “communities 
of interest” boils down to preserving existing political boundaries, 
like county or municipal lines. These boundaries, like all geographic 
boundaries are man-made constructs, most of which have virtually no 
modern political justifications.  
Figure 1 depicts the state of Texas with all of its 254 county 
boundaries. Undoubtedly there are some interesting stories to be told 
for why some of these boundaries exist, but clearly the lines were 
drawn with an eye toward compactness. All of the rectangular 
counties in the Texas panhandle are good examples—why was the 
state cut into neat squares? One hears, possibly apocryphal, stories 
that counties were drawn this way so that every resident of a county 
was no more than a single day’s horse ride away from the county seat. 
What is clear though is that county lines were not drawn to 
encapsulate existing communities of interest. Therefore, it is not clear 
why we should care today about these boundaries when drawing 
legislative districts. County lines were drawn arbitrarily many years 
ago, so letting ancient decisions dictate what a modern electoral 
district ought to look like is misguided.  
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Figure 1. Map of Texas with County Boundaries 
 
 
V. DATA & HYPOTHESES 
There are several key pieces of information needed for this study. 
First, I gathered population data of each state legislative district for 
lower chambers in all fifty states after the 2000 round of 
redistricting.59 Next, the results of legislative elections across the 
country in the first post-redistricting election were compiled. These 
                                                                                                                 
59
 The unit of analysis in this Article is the state legislative district. This is important 
inasmuch as some states use multimember districts (“MMD”). Some, like North Dakota have 
forty-seven districts, all of which elect two legislators. Others, like Georgia, use a mixture of 
single member districts and different sized MMD’s.  
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data are used to code partisanship of each district. While, it would be 
preferable to use some ex-ante piece of information to determine 
which party is favored in each district, like presidential or statewide 
election data broken down by the new districts, gathering this data for 
each state is impossible. Most, but certainly not all, districts perform 
the way in which one would expect prior to the election, so using 
these data is a reasonable alternative. Lastly, the information 
regarding who controlled the districting process in each state was 
gathered. This information came from Michael McDonald’s 2004 
article A Comparative Analysis of Redistricting Institutions in the 
United States, 2001-02.60  
Population data were downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau 
website.61 They have population figures by state legislative districts 
for each state in the country. Unfortunately, the data for some states is 
unusable. For instance, Hawaii and Kansas both adjust the census 
totals, taking out military personnel and university students for 
instance, so these data were gathered by calling the elections office in 
the respective states.62 
The theory guiding this research is quite simple—we expect that 
when one party controls the mechanism for redistricting it will use 
that power to its advantage. So, if the Republicans control the state 
legislature and the governor’s office and the state government handles 
redistricting, then the plan should favor the Republicans. In this case 
that means districts that lean Republican should be systematically 
underpopulated relative to those districts that lean Democratic. When 
the Democrats control, their districts will have fewer people 
compared to Republican districts. This allows a party to save their 
voters for other districts and waste voters from the other party.  
 
                                                                                                                 
60
 This information came from Michael P. McDonald, A Comparative Analysis of 
Redistricting Institutions in the United States, 2001–02, 4 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 371, 371–90 
(2004). Minor adjustments were made to McDonald’s codes. Several states were coded as 
“Divided Legislature,” indicating one party controlled each of the chambers. In these instances, 
we did further research to see whether the chambers would be drawn by the controlling party. 
We found evidence in several states to indicate this. The lower chambers in New York and 
Nevada were drawn to favor the Democrats; the lower chamber in Delaware was drawn to favor 
the Republicans. News accounts and data from these states confirm the revised codes. Thus, 
while McDonald’s codes are correct, in just looking at a single chamber the revised codes are 
more appropriate. 
61 Data Access Tools, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/access.html (last revised Mar. 26, 2012).  
62 The data for the following states was changed based on data gathered by the author 
directly from the offices of each of the states—Kansas, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. 
Three states have been dropped from the analysis in this Article—Nebraska because it is 
unicameral and Vermont and New Hampshire because merging population data and election 
outcomes was impossible. 
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Figure 2. The Impact of Partisan Control of Redistricting on State 
Legislative Population Deviations Circa 200263 
 
 
VI. RESULTS 
Figure 2 plots the partisan population deviations of forty-seven 
states. To construct this figure each legislative seat in every state is 
coded as either Democrat or Republican, based on which party won 
the seat in the 2002 election (third party victories were dropped). 
Next, the average population of Republican districts is subtracted 
from the average population of Democratic districts, and the resultant 
is divided by the ideal population for districts in each state. This 
creates a percentage difference with negative numbers indicating that 
                                                                                                                 
63 Black bars indicate Democrats controlled the redistricting process; grey bars indicate 
Republicans controlled the process; white bars indicate the process was either controlled by both 
parties, a commission, or drawn by a court (using the codes from McDonald supra note 60 with 
some previously noted exceptions). The graph depicts the percentage deviations that favor one 
party or the other with negative numbers indicating Democrat controlled districts were, on 
average, underpopulated, and positive numbers indicating that Republican controlled districts 
were, on average, underpopulated. 
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Democratic districts are advantaged because they have systematically 
fewer people in their districts relative to Republican districts, and 
positive numbers indicating a Republican advantage.   
Since most of the bars are negative, the data indicate that that 
Democrats do much better around the country in terms of winning 
elections in districts that are underpopulated. Moreover, when the 
Republicans are advantaged, the average population differences are 
relatively small. The three Republican controlled states that used this 
tool to the greatest effect are Delaware, Utah, and North Dakota. 
There are two states, West Virginia and Colorado, where the process 
was Democratically controlled, yet the population deviations favored 
the Republicans. On the other side, seven of the top nine states that 
favor Democrats were drawn by Democrats. The most egregious 
partisan deviations that favor Democrats were drawn in states where 
the Democrats controlled the process. Georgia continues to be an 
exemplar insofar as the state’s plan used this tool more effectively 
than any other state. Maryland, Mississippi, New York, and Alabama 
also have high deviations that favor the Democrats. The states that 
were not controlled directly by partisans tend to have smaller 
population deviations indicating that on this dimension of partisan 
gerrymandering we ought to expect less partisan outcomes when the 
process is controlled by courts, commissions, or the power is shared 
by both parties.  
There are a handful of states where the population deviations are 
essentially zero—California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington. While some states, 
such as Florida, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington 
(among others), have state constitutional language that requires that 
legislative districts be drawn with population “as equal as practicable” 
this is not a strict one person, one vote requirement. Those that draw 
the lines are required to stay within federal guidelines (i.e., the 10 
percent limit), but are not required to draw districts that have exactly 
the same number of people in them.  
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Table 1. The Impact of Partisan Redistricting Control on Partisan 
Population Deviations in State Legislative Districts, 200264 
 
Redistricting Authority     -0.595** 
              (.199) 
Constant           -0.539** 
              (.164) 
N              47 
R2             .17 
 
Going beyond graphical representations of the data, we can also 
see whether there are systematic differences in the deviations based 
on who controls the redistricting process. Table 1 presents the results 
of a bivariate regression that demonstrates the relationship between 
partisan control and partisan population deviations. The coefficient is 
negative and significant, as we would expect. Democrats tend to 
underpopulate districts won by Democrats and Republicans 
underpopulate districts won by Republicans. The Republicans did not 
take advantage of this tool as much as the Democrats did in 2000. The 
average percent difference for Democratically controlled states is -
1.19, indicating the districts won by Democrats tend to be 
underpopulated. For the Republicans the average is -0.18, indicating 
that, on average, they draw districts that also favor the Democrats by 
overpopulating Republican controlled districts, though not nearly as 
much as the Democrats did. The average for the other states (courts, 
commissions, or divided control) is -0.40.   
Looking at data for just one decade is not sufficient to make 
conclusions about long term systematic biases in this aspect of 
redistricting, but we can conclude that, at least for the 2000 round of 
redistricting, the data demonstrate that the “10 percent rule” that 
allows for modest population deviations is used in many states for 
partisan purposes and the Democrats were the beneficiaries of these 
deviations more often than the Republicans. 
It is also important to not just look at the average deviations in a 
state, but to examine these deviations to further investigate how, and 
to what extent, a party might be using deviations for partisan 
purposes. The exemplar for using population deviations for partisan 
gerrymandering continues to be Georgia in 2002. Figure 3 depicts the 
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 * p<.05, ** p<.01. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the percent deviations pictured in Figure 2. The 
redistricting authority takes on values of -1 if the Republican Party controlled the process; 1 if 
the Democrats controlled the process; 0 if districting was done by a court, a commission, or 
divided partisan control. 
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population deviations by party for the 2002 lower chamber of the 
Georgia state legislature.   
 
Figure 3. Population Deviation in the Georgia State Legislature65 
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It is plainly evident what is intended, the Democratic distribution 
has almost no overpopulated districts, and the Republican distribution 
has almost no underpopulated districts. There is a systematic bias 
introduced by utilizing population deviations in this way. The average 
population in Republican districts is 46,568 and only 44,710 in 
Democratic districts. So for each GOP-leaning district the mapmakers 
put in nearly 2,000 extra people, which wastes those votes in the 
sense that they cannot be used in a neighboring district to increase the 
share of Republican voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
65
 This graph depicts the distribution of deviations from the ideal population in the state 
legislative districts for the Georgia lower chamber circa 2002. 
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Figure 4. Population Deviations in Iowa State Legislature66 
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Figure 4 depicts the percent deviations for the lower chamber of 
the Iowa state legislature. First, it is important to note that the Iowa 
remappers restricted deviations to no more than plus or minus one 
percent, which necessarily restricts the total amount of bias that can 
be introduced through unbalanced, partisan districts. More 
importantly, the modal category is near zero for both parties and there 
is some balance on either side. The Republican distribution is slightly 
to the left (toward districts that are underpopulated), but overall there 
is very little difference to speak of and no real systematic bias that 
favors one party or the other. Iowa mapmakers did utilize the ability 
to deviate from ideal population in districts, but they did not take full 
advantage of the range of deviations, which kept the districts closer to 
the ideal population. Unfortunately, many states do not take the same 
balanced approach that Iowa did in the last round of redistricting. 
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 This graph depicts the distribution of deviations from the ideal population in the state 
legislative districts for the Iowa lower chamber circa 2002. 
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Figure 5. Population Deviations in Utah State Legislature67 
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Figure 5 depicts the distribution of population by party from the 
state of Utah. This is the state with the most clearly partisan map 
created by Republicans in terms of the use of population deviations. It 
looks a great deal like the distributions from Georgia just with the 
Republicans as the beneficiaries of the underpopulated districts. The 
line drawers did not quite exploit this loophole to the extent that they 
did in Georgia, but it is still clear what is occurring—more 
Republican districts are made possible by using completely legal 
population deviations. 
CONCLUSION 
State legislative redistricting has been subject to more lax 
standards than congressional redistricting in terms of the extent to 
which districts within a state must be equally populous. Until 
recently, most observers assumed a 10 percent deviation was 
acceptable without any justification from the state. Cox, however, has 
made it clear that naked partisanship is not a justifiable reason to 
systematically underpopulate some districts and overpopulate 
                                                                                                                 
67
 This graph depicts the distribution of deviations from the ideal population in the state 
legislative districts for the Utah lower chamber circa 2002. 
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others.68 Cox, however, is likely not going to stop mapmakers from 
manipulating population deviations. So while it may be safe to expect 
fewer maps testing the outer limits of the 10 percent rule, the critical 
component is not to flaunt the gerrymander publicly.  
That using population deviation is a simple and effective method 
for a party to gerrymander its way into a few extra seats that it might 
not otherwise control if districts were drawn to more exacting OPOV 
standards is clear. Indeed, the major parties do take advantage of this 
exception and often for partisan purposes. The data from the 2000 
round of redistricting show that the Democrats tend to fare better than 
their GOP counterparts, meaning that Democratic candidates won 
more seats from underpopulated districts than Republican candidates 
did. The data also show, however, that many states did not use this 
tool for partisan purposes. And while Cox provides some protection 
against this type of gerrymandering, we can easily dispense with this 
tool altogether by requiring perfect population equality.  
A modern twist on the OPOV theory is to not try to equalize 
districts on the total number of people, but on, for instance, the 
number of citizens that are voting age population or even the number 
of actual voters. The most oft cited person in this controversy is Judge 
Alex Kozinski, who in his dissent in Garza v. County of Los Angeles69 
outlined the difference between the principle of equality of 
representation and the principle of electoral equality.70 The former 
flows with the current state of affairs in which all people, regardless 
of age, race, citizenship, etc. are weighted equally in drawing 
districts.71 Judge Kozinski argues for the electoral equality principle 
in which votes are weighted equally.72 So, for example, Hispanic 
districts with large proportions of non-citizens are, as currently 
drawn, far too small because the number of eligible or actual voters in 
these kinds of districts is far fewer in number than other districts with 
fewer non-citizens. Similarly, there are parts of the country with 
higher birth rates that may have larger populations of citizens that are 
not of legal voting age. Moreover districts vary widely in terms of 
turnout. There is a well-known “turnout bias” in which those districts 
that Republicans win tend to have higher turnout than Democratic 
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 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text for discussion of Cox.   
69
 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
70
 Id. at 778–88 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
71
 See id. at 781 (“Apportionment by raw population embodies the principle of equal 
representation; it assures that all persons living within a district-whether eligible to vote or not-
have roughly equal representation in the governing body.”). 
72
 See id. at 782 (“The principle of electoral equality assures that, regardless of the size of 
the whole body of constituents, political power, as defined by the number of those eligible to 
vote, is equalized as between districts holding the same number of representatives.”). 
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districts, so the Democrats win more seats with fewer overall votes.73 
But currently we district strictly on the basis of total population as 
counted in the decennial Census.  
As we finish yet another round of redistricting across the country, 
this seems like an appropriate time to reflect on whether population 
deviations in legislative redistricting ought to be scrutinized more 
carefully.74 The typical justifications for these deviations usually 
amount to the preservation of existing communities of interest. This 
slippery concept usually involved pre-existing political boundaries—
counties, municipalities, and the like. I argue that weighting each 
citizen’s vote equally is a more important concept in terms of 
representation, than preserving communities of interest.  
Eliminating population deviations for all electoral districts will not 
completely eradicate partisan gerrymandering, to be sure, because 
“population equality guarantees almost no form of fairness beyond 
numerical equality of population.”75 Insisting that mapmakers strictly 
adhere to OPOV, however, eliminates a tool that can be used to 
extract partisan advantages with relative ease. Further, equal 
population across districts is very important, particularly in light of 
how badly malapportioned districts were before the “redistricting 
revolution” of the 1960’s. A strict OPOV standard also reaffirms the 
important principle that underlies those early court decisions—that all 
votes should be equally weighted. In sum, none of the alleged benefits 
of allowing population differences across districts outweighs the costs 
of unequally weighted votes. This could result in a marginal increase 
in the number of cities and counties being split, but equalizing voting 
power of individuals is a greater democratic value than keeping cities 
and counties intact within a district. 
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 Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, & Thomas Brunell, An Integrated Perspective on 
the Three Potential Sources of Partisan Bias: Malapportionment, Turnout Differences, and the 
Geographic Distribution of Party Vote Shares, 16 ELECTORAL STUD. 457, 466 (1997). 
74
 Reconsidering the appropriateness of drawing “competitive districts” is also in order. 
See generally THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY 
COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA (2008) (offering a critique of the goal of 
creating competitive districts via the redistricting process); JUSTICE BUCHLER, HIRING AND 
FIRING PUBLIC OFFICIALS: RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF ELECTIONS (2011) (same).  
75
 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative 
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 553 (1994).  
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